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Abstract
This contribution honouring Prof. Martin Krygier scholarship provides a brief criti-
cal reading of the European Commission’s July 2019 Communication on the Rule of 
Law (COM(2019) 343 final). It argues that although the Commission’s effort is wel-
come, the Communication fails to correctly identify the core problem related to the 
Rule of Law in the EU, which is the constitutional capture in the illiberal regimes. 
The failure to identify the core problem with unequivocal precision and spell out 
its key elements as well as dissect its causes undermines the likely effectiveness of 
the tools proposed by the Commission to address the unnamed and unanalyzed on-
going Rule of Law concerns. Consequently, the Communication is lacking in vital 
essentials, if not vacant at the core.
The first aim of this brief contribution is to record the admiration and respect vis-à-
vis a beloved CEU Professor and an inspiring colleague for his overwhelming con-
tribution to the study and teaching of the Rule of Law worldwide. To flag persisting 
Rule of Law problems in the EU, this short note is thus to accompany a parcel with a 
Leonard Paris Tie (Dessin No. 68755, with signal flags on golden cords—I hope that 
you do not yet have such, Martin!)1 and a more conventional, non-academic ‘Thank 
You’ note. From the classes in Budapest to conferences all over the world, from Cam-
bridge to Princeton and New York, Professor Krygier’s modest towering presence 
is always humbling, friendly and inspiring. I am doubly grateful: besides ground-
breaking work on the Rule of Law guiding numerous scholars in their understand-
ing of the complex concept, he also managed to explain parts of the great Professor 
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Palombella’s œuvre2 (a task which many would find impossible) to the non-adept 
public with grace, simplicity and precision,3 which resulted in attempts to apply the 
insights of both scholars to the current reality in the EU.4 I am hugely grateful for 
all of this, dear Professor Krygier. Your work stands out in the Rule of Law scholar-
ship landscape akin to what Daniel Tribouillard required of his chef-d’œuvres of silk 
printing: it is simple, unique, and all-encompassing: ‘une fleur posée sur soie’.5
The second aim of this brief contribution is to provide a critical assessment of 
the Commission’s July 2019 Communication on the Rule of Law,6 which is inter-
esting in two senses. Firstly, it appears at a time when the Union is embroiled in 
the worst Rule of Law crisis since its inception7 following the authoritarian turn 
in two Member States and the ample demonstration by all the institutions of 
the Union of the lack of political will to deal with the ongoing crisis,8 notwith-
standing the activation of Article 7(1) TEU in reaction to the abuses that are 
still taking place in two Member States—a misuse of an inapplicable legal basis 
for action, no doubt, given the state of affairs.9 Only the Court of Justice seems 
to be faithful to the EU Rule of Law promise in Article 2 TEU,10 having rein-
vented Article 19 TEU for the purpose of standing up to the dismantling of judi-
cial independence, one of the core constitutional basic principles on which the 
Union is founded.11 The Commission was thus long overdue in saying something 
meaningful on this matter of core constitutional importance—following its quite 
dubious ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ from 2014,12 which has neither been consist-
ently applied, nor has it brought any fruit whatsoever: exactly as predicted in the 
literature.13 In July 2019 the Commission finally told us what it thinks should be 
done—and accordingly, given, once again, the dramatic context of the constitu-
tional decline in at least two Member States, the Commission’s Communication 
is of crucial importance.
5 Tribouillard and Privat Savigny (2006).
6 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law within the European Union: A Blueprint for 
Action. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, COM(2019) 
343 final.
7 Sadurski (2019); Pech and Scheppele (2017).
8 Kochenov et al. (2016); Szente (2017).
9 Besselink (2017); Bugarič (2016). Cf., for a purely ‘black letter’ treatment: Kochenov (2019a).
10 Klamert and Kochenov (2019). Specifically on the EU Rule of Law, see, most importantly, Pech 
(2009, 2016); Platon 2019. On the rebranding of the principle of the Rule of Law as a ‘value’ during the 
Lisbon revision of the Treaties, see, Pech (2010).
11 CMLRev Editorial Comment (2019); Kochenov and Bárd (2019). Martin Krygier provides an excel-
lent discussion of the relationship between constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Krygier (2017).
12 European Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’, Strasbourg, 11 March 
2014, COM(2014) 158 final. Cf. Kochenov and Pech (2015, 2016).
13 Kochenov et al. (2015).
4 Kochenov (2015).
2 E.g. Palombella (2010); Palombella (2009), p. 17. Cf., in direct engagement with Krygier, Palombella 
(2019).
3 Krygier (2014).
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Ironically, the Commission is (tactically?) silent about the core of the problem 
at hand, thus offering the second point of departure in reading the Communication: 
it is crucial what the Commission does not say. It does not expressly say a single 
word about the constitutional capture in several Member States,14 which are being 
turned into de facto one-party regimes without an independent judiciary that meets 
the requirements of Article 19 TEU and, of course, without serious adherence to the 
core principles and values on which the Union is founded, thus exemplifying Kim 
Scheppele’s concept of ‘autocratic legalism’.15 Equally, the Commission says noth-
ing about the mutual learning16 between the captured states to perfect the undoing of 
rights and freedoms of Europeans, which the Union has promised to protect, includ-
ing during the last three rounds of enlargement.17 Martin Krygier’s wonderful Rule 
of Law ‘abuser’s guide’18 put into practice, most regrettably, by the Hungarian and 
Polish governments mired in an abuse of power, goes unnoticed and unchecked—
at least on the surface that is. Assuming for a moment that the reader is aware of 
the context of constitutional capture in Hungary and Poland—a set of developments 
which has been richly documented19—this contribution will focus mostly on what 
the Commission tells Europeans and EU institutions and what it does not.
Following the Rule of Law consultation in April 2019, on 17 July 2019—in the 
interregnum—the European Commission published its Communication summaris-
ing this institution’s main ideas aimed at strengthening the rule of law within the 
Union. The key innovations are twofold. Firstly, it is the introduction of the regular 
Rule of Law reporting cycle, which is also in line with what the European Parlia-
ment has long argued for.20 Secondly, it is paying more attention to the financial 
strings at the Union’s disposal to guarantee that the Rule of Law and other core val-
ues are complied with: corruption and the destruction of democratic institutions and 
independent courts should not continue being rewarded with taxpayers’ money from 
other Member States as has been the case up until now.
What the Commission proposed is in line, in large part, with what has been 
argued by the leading scholars engaged with the problem at hand all along and sum-
marised in a Policy Brief, submitted to the Commission as part of the consultation 
by Laurent Pech and myself, outlining with clarity the prevailing assessments of the 
current situation and the Commission’s role played therein across the relevant lit-
erature: proof that good ideas are in the air, as it were.21 While it is in line with 
the thoughts expressed in our Policy Brief, the Commission’s contribution seems to 
be punching way below the weight of that institution in terms of supplying a clear 
and realistic assessment of what the EU is dealing with today: the reasons behind 
14 Pech and Scheppele (2017); Scheppele (2017).
15 Scheppele (2018). Cf. Sajó (2019).
16 Pech and Scheppele (2017).
17 Sadurski (2012); Kochenov (2008).
18 Krygier (2006).
19 E.g. Sadurski (2019); Blay-Grabarczyk (2019); Magyar (2016); Szente (2017); Sólyom (2015); 
Scheppele (2015).
20 Cf. Bárd et al. (2016).
21 Pech and Kochenov (2019).
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the Communication in the first place. There is little room for jubilance, in fact: 
the Communication’s weakest point is the Commission’s inability to call a spade 
a spade—akin to the unhelpful views expressed in President-elect von der Leyen’s 
first interviews, who opined, in the context of the crises in Poland and Hungary 
that ‘nobody’s perfect’22—the Communication fails to take the problem—a deeply 
exceptional depth of the constitutional capture in two Member States—seriously 
enough to place it at the centre of its resulting hugely befogged analysis. By failing 
to mention, let alone explain, what the actual core problems with the Rule of Law 
that the EU is facing are—and to engage sufficiently with the idea of constitutional 
capture, which does not feature in the Communication at all—the Commission has 
consequently left the most fundamental Rule of Law problems out of the picture, 
effectively disconnecting the Rule of Law Communication from the essence of the 
ongoing fight for the Rule of Law on the ground in the abusive Member States. It 
is the idea that some Member States would proactively seek to undermine the Rule 
of Law in order to create de facto one-party regimes where democracy is paralysed 
and the Rule of Law is hollowed that is missing from the Communication. It is thus 
precisely the Rule of Law—ironically, but also sadly—which is the elephant in the 
room.
1  What the Commission Wants to Do
The Commission’s optimistically-titled Communication on ‘Strengthening the Rule 
of Law within the Union: A Blueprint for Action’ sets a number of commitments that 
the Commission intends to honour and also formulates recommendations addressed 
to other EU institutions, Member States and non-governmental actors. According 
to the Commission, it sets out concrete actions for the short and medium term aim-
ing to resolve the outstanding rule of law issues.23 In a somewhat lengthy introduc-
tion that does not explain the nature of Rule of Law backsliding in troubled Mem-
ber States (Hungary and Poland, the only targets of Article 7 TEU activation in the 
EU’s history—however unhelpful24—are never mentioned, just as the fact of Article 
7 TEU being deployed) the Commission restates all the mantras of an ‘EU based 
on values’, which the problematic Member States are very familiar with since these 
were part of the pre-accession conditionality exercise conducted by the Commission 
earlier in this millennium, the failure of which resulted in the ongoing Rule of Law 
crisis25—the one which the Communication’s silence tries to tackle.26 Importantly, 
the Commission is entirely silent also on any other causes of the problems both on 
25 Kochenov (2008).
26 Cf. Halmai (2019).
22 Rettmann (2019).
23 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law within the European Union: A Blueprint for 
Action. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, COM(2019) 
343 final, p. 2.
24 Kochenov (2019b).
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the ground—in the Member States—and at the EU level, thus not addressing not 
only the Member State-level principled ignorance of the principles which caused 
the crisis at hand, but also the EU’s weak and incapable reaction to the Rule of Law 
problems that arose as a result. Scholars have been clear on what the key causes of 
the latter are: the lack of a clear will by the Member States and the inability of the 
EU institutions to utilize the full potential of the available legal instruments avail-
able to match the gravity of the problem. The Commission has nothing in stock in its 
new Communication to address the core causes of the current Rule of Law problems 
it purports to be dealing with. This concerns not only the level of action (Mem-
ber States opposed to the EU itself in the complex multi-level Rule of Law setting 
seriously affecting the workability of the possible solutions27) but also the nature of 
the action available—from the focus on enforcement,28 criticized in the literature for 
the obvious lack of sociological legitimacy,29 to the option of deeper EU reform.30 
Without outlining the causes, it is difficult, of course, to expect effective solutions, 
even in a highly political world, like Brussels.
Once we move on from what is not in the Communication, the text per se is 
respectable: the Commission attempts to make a strong case for being serious about 
the Rule of Law31 citing both citizens’ concerns flowing very clearly form the latest 
Eurobarometer surveys and also welcoming the new significant steps by the Court 
of Justice of the EU in the direction of fine-tuning the values of Article 2 TEU to 
turn them into practically applicable principles in the context of EU law: the process 
emerging with particular clarity in the context of the reinterpretation of the scope 
of Article 19 TEU, which has truly far-reaching implications in the current context. 
The Communication follows the structure offered in the consultation document pub-
lished by the Commission in April 2019 and analyses the possible actions in three 
areas: promotion, prevention and enforcement.
1.1  Promotion
The aspect of the promotion of the Rule of Law has two dimensions in the Commu-
nication. The first one concentrates on the role of civil society and the need to sup-
port it by new programmes (e.g. Rights and Values programme and Creative Europe 
programme). In this context the Commission mentions an ‘yearly event on rule of 
law’ for dialogue with civil society as well as a new communication strategy. All the 
right buzz words are mentioned, including cooperation with academia and civil soci-
ety, a renewed role for the Rule of Law in education and the like. The Commission 
wants everyone to speak with everyone about the Rule of Law, including national 
parliaments, international organizations and institutions. This is where the puzzling 
lack of clarity about the nature of the problem the Commission is aiming to address, 
27 Palombella (2016).
28 Scheppele (2016). Cf., in general, Jakab and Kochenov (2017a).
29 Weiler (2016); Blokker (2016, 2018, 2019).
30 Bugarič (2016).
31 This case has been made by academia, inter alia, by Closa (2016).
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as well as the causes of this non-disclosed problem to which the Commission’s 
17 dense pages are dedicated, is starting to bite: if some elections, although free, 
are not fair,32 how much ‘Rule of Law learning’ can we expect from the dialogues 
between the unfairly elected ‘parliaments’ in the captured Member States and real 
parliaments? What can those who are engaged in constitutional capture learn from 
academia, when whole academies are dismantled (like the Hungarian Academy) and 
the best University in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe has been driven out 
from Hungary (like CEU)?33 What can we learn from the NGOs if captured Member 
States cut their funding streams and harass those who still dare to criticise the politi-
cians in power?34 The Communication even calls on the European Parliament and 
national parliaments to develop specific inter-parliamentary cooperation on Rule of 
Law issues, to which the Commission could contribute. Not mentioning constitu-
tional capture, besides diluting the message, thus allows the Commission to come 
up with deeply questionable and entirely misplaced recommendations, which look 
good enough on paper to be welcomed solely by those who have zero knowledge of 
the core issues at stake. The Commission seems to be willing to send a message of 
friendly ignorance, which could unfortunately be dangerous, given the high stakes 
involved.
The second dimension of the promotion of the Rule of Law advocated by the 
Commission in its 2019 Communication deals with the relationship between the 
European Union and the Council of Europe and its institutions (the Venice Com-
mission and GRECO) which was famously torpedoed by the Court of Justice in its 
Opinion 2/1335 bid for the purification of the absolute autonomy of the legal order36 
of which it is the custodian, using the Rule of Law as a shield against the intro-
duction of the high standards of human rights protection in the EU,37 thus exac-
erbating eventual justice deficit problems38 with direct Rule of Law implications39 
and upholding the ongoing neo-mediaeval tendencies in the Union’s equality law,40 
going down to the core of the functioning of the legal system,41 which is turning, for 
one reason or another,42 into a system functioning in the name of a narrow mean-
ing of a Treaty text, rather than deploying justice principles.43 The Venice Com-
mission and GRECO are all fine, but mentioning the revamping of the CoE acces-
sion process—notwithstanding the fact that the EU is obliged by the Treaties, of 
33 Redden (2018).
34 Szuleka (2018).
35 Opinion 2/13 ECHR Accession II [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454; Eeckhout (2015).
36 And this is not to deny that autonomy is of crucial importance, of course; it is its limits that are natu-
rally always contested: Lenaerts (2019).
37 Kochenov (2015).
38 Williams (2009); Roy (2015).
39 Douglas-Scott (2015).
40 O’Brien (2018); Kochenov (2016).
41 de Búrca (1997), p. 14.
42 Spaventa (2017); Nic Shuibhne (2017).
43 Williams (2010).
32 Walker and Boffey (2018).
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course, to eventually accede—is both puzzling and somewhat, if not entirely, out 
of place. Whatever one thinks of the CoE—and the EU unquestionably has a lot to 
learn from that organisation also beyond the pre-accession context44—again, should 
the Commission formulate the constitutional capture problem clearly, there would 
be no need at all to spill the ink focusing on the unlikely developments that our 
self-minded Court does not welcome.45 Indeed, in viewing itself, as a matter of prin-
ciple, as unable to be constitutionally limited by the ECt.HR, the Court of Justice, 
although potentially pushing for ‘EU Law without the Rule of Law’46 does not actu-
ally either create or solve any problem. The EU’s accession is of no relevance for the 
most burning issues facing Hungary and Poland today and the Commission could be 
expected to be clear on this: Rule of Law backsliding and the crisis it has caused has 
nothing to do with the EU’s accession to the ECHR.
Where the position of the Court of Justice is of huge relevance, however, is the 
revamped understanding of judicial independence in the EU legal context through 
the renewed interpretation of Article 19 TEU. And here the Commission is abso-
lutely right to summarize the recent groundbreaking case law of the Court of Jus-
tice on the Rule of Law and judicial independence. One of the core causes of the 
problem that the Commission does not formulate is that, contrary to the apparent 
intention of the drafters, it has not been the Council, the Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament acting in the context of Article 7 TEU, but the Court, armed with 
Article 19 TEU, that emerged as the most robust critical interlocutor of the autocrats 
in Poland and Hungary. This is unquestionably clear testimony of the failure of the 
EU institutions, which however is not surprising, given the confrontational nature 
of Article 7, which is opposed par excellence to the very interpenetrationist logic of 
the internal market.47
1.2  Prevention
The core element of prevention in the Commission’s Rule of Law Communication is 
the necessity ‘to facilitate cooperation and dialogue’48: the key paradigm is thus that 
of compliant Member States unwillingly sleepwalking into non-compliance with the 
values. This paradigm is flawed. The fact that it is not clear right away based on 
what the Commission presents is solely due to the failure of the institution to pro-
vide a clear and compelling analysis of the actual problems the EU and the Member 
States are facing in the area of the Rule of Law. What I described together with 
András Jakab elsewhere as the intuitive ‘spectrum of defiance’ could assist us in 
47 Kochenov (2019b).
48 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law within the European Union: A Blueprint for 
Action. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, COM(2019) 
343 final, p. 9.
44 Cf. e.g. Kochenov (2006).




illustrating what is going on: there are—quite obviously, and the Commission knows 
this very well—Member States which deviate from the Rule of Law as a matter of 
a calculated policy choice, thus not at all by mistake.49 Rule of Law violations are 
not all the same and this basic point, which the Commission fails to make run like 
a red thread through the Communication, is absolutely crucial. The Member States 
that took a political choice, which is not formally available in the EU’s constitu-
tional landscape, to oppose the values of Article 2 TEU are the most important prob-
lem, not the ones which are unknowingly non-compliant and negligent.50 Solving 
this problem through dialogue and cooperation is impossible, since dialogue and 
cooperation cannot be an answer to a calculated choice not to comply with the core 
principles, thus abusing the vulnerabilities of the enforcement tools available in the 
context of the EU legal system, while freeriding on the principle of mutual trust and 
reaping the economic benefits of the internal market. The situation of Hungary and 
Poland today is thus radically different from that of the Member States with troubled 
institutional structures, such as Greece,51 Member States with particular electoral 
outcomes,52 or Member States in principled disagreement with the EU on the func-
tioning of some principles, as was the case with Germany and its courts, pushing 
through the change in the EU’s approach to the idea of human rights protection.53
Yet—and quite astonishingly—it is by responding to the sleepwalking prob-
lem—which is not the cause of the Rule of Law crisis in the EU—in the context of 
this ‘benevolent Member State paradigm’—which is a flawed representation of the 
nature of the Member States experiencing constitutional capture—that the Commis-
sion made its core proposal. The Commission will institute the ‘Rule of Law Review 
Cycle’—a general annual process concerning all the Member States and boasting a 
very broad scope covering core elements of reform as well as the day-to-day func-
tioning of all the branches of power in any field of competence. This will include 
law-making, effective judicial protection, the independence and impartiality of the 
courts, the separation of powers, and also the capacity of Member States to fight 
corruption, as well as media pluralism and elections. Accompanied by a network of 
experts in the field of the Rule of Law, the regular exercise will thus establish com-
munication channels between the Member States on this issue, including the Mem-
ber States which decided to turn one-party and not to abide by the basic principles 
of Article 2 TEU, thereby denying their citizens, and all the other EU citizens choos-
ing to settle there, access to democracy and the Rule of Law emerging as neo-Soviet 




52 Which was at the core of the FPÖ crisis in Austria leading, inter alia, also to a reform of Article 7 
TEU: Lachmayer (2017); Toggenburg (2001). On Art. 7 TEU in this context see, Sadurski (2010).
53 Mayer (2017).
49 Jakab and Kochenov (2017b).
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Any seasoned observer of pre-accession window-dressing exercises becomes 
instantly worried54: what the Commission seemingly proposes in essence amounts 
to the repetition of the pre-accession country reporting in the areas of democracy 
and the Rule of Law as well as other principles assessed in the context of the Copen-
hagen political criteria,55 but with one crucial difference: to apply this to the actual 
Member States. The outcome of the pre-accession process, which has been reported 
as a huge success, is, precisely, the Rule of Law crises in Poland and Hungary as 
well as a most wobbly situation with the Rule of Law in a handful of other Member 
States.
Granted: past failures—even if reported as successes—should not necessarily 
discourage us from being optimistic about the future. There are two more prob-
lems with the regular assessment proposed by the Commission, however. Firstly, it 
threatens to significantly alter the nature of EU federalism56: for the Commission to 
mingle with the essential features of the Member States outside the scope of funda-
mentally exceptional cases—such as Hungary and Poland today—has the potential 
to open the Pandora’s box of the re-articulation of the limits of EU action. The out-
come could be ongoing violations in the powerful Member States coupled with the 
increased bullying of the smallest Member States, which would have little say in 
the face of the Commission’s pressure in a situation where the law is merely ‘soft’ 
and, consequently, the strictness of the basic rules regarding the division of powers 
between the EU and the Member States becomes more and more lax.57 Even worse, 
secondly, the regular reporting is premised on the Member States’ benevolence and 
their willingness to comply. Given that the starting paradigm mistakenly embraced 
by the Commission is entirely false, as demonstrated above, the outcomes of what 
the Commission proposed—in the form it proposed it—are highly unlikely to bring 
about a positive change to the EU’s Rule of Law landscape, let alone solve the core 
Rule of Law problems on which the Commission’s Communication remains silent. 
What they can do, however, is endanger the fragile balance of powers between the 
EU and the Member States in a situation where outright exceptional cases, which 
are absolutely clear, are not referred to by name. A false paradigm cannot be placed 
at the core of the crucial roadmap to solve the outstanding problems, however 
ill-identified.
How does the Commission intend to deploy its reporting? In the context of its 
Rule of Law Communication the Commission underlined the role of the Fundamen-
tal Rights Agency, which developed the EU Fundamental Rights Information Sys-
tem (EFRIS)—a comprehensive database that is relevant for rule of law discussion. 
Furthermore, a network of national contact points in the Member States will be set 
up for dialogue on rule of law issues. The Rule of Law Review Cycle will result in 
the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report, based partially on existing instru-
ments such as the Justice Scoreboard and the European Semester. In light of the 
54 De Ridder and Kochenov (2011).
55 Janse (2019); Hillion (2004); Kochenov (2004); Maresceau (2001).
56 For a delightful introduction, see the irreplaceable Schütze (2009); cf. Kochenov (2017b).
57 Ştefan (2013, 2017).
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Communication, the annual report shall be a starting point for debates on Rule of 
Law issues conducted by the European Parliament and the Council. Grimheden and 
Toggenburg have long advocated the deeper involvement of the FRA in the man-
agement of the Rule of Law crises and it is great that the Commission is starting to 
take the Agency seriously in the Rule of Law context.58 The Commission equally 
proposes to have a broad array of stakeholders involved in this reporting exercise, 
thus, again, borrowing from the pre-accession, where everyone was heard but this 
did not improve the wanting quality of the Commission’s reporting resulting, to 
great degree, in the Rule of Law crisis that the EU is facing at the moment.59 What 
is new and welcome in the Commission’s Communication is a direct reference to 
the responsibility of the European political parties for their national counterparts 
respecting the necessary values up to the potential responsibility in terms of fund-
ing that they receive within the framework of Regulation 1141/2014.60 Making the 
EPPs pay for the appeasing of the destruction of the Rule of Law in Hungary61 is 
definitely an appealing idea, which is long overdue, but referring to the law in force 
proposes nothing new, of course. Using the law would be new—and here the ques-
tions are for the Commission as the guardian of the Treaties as to why it has been 
ignored so far.
All of the above does not change, however, the core question that arises: given 
that the Member States are not all benevolent and that the previous reporting as con-
ducted by the Commission in the context of pre-accession failed to provide a reliable 
assessment of the entrenchment of the values of Article 2 TEU in what are now new 
EU Member States, thus effectively leaving us with the problem, what is the added 
value of the new reporting exercise that the Commission has proposed? The ques-
tion is particularly acute given that the Commission’s analysis is mute on the prob-
lem of constitutional capture and would thus assess Hungary next to Finland and 
Ireland, which is wasteful and unhelpful in the context of refusing to see what the 
core of the current problems is. To state that we are short of information on the Rule 
of Law in the Member States would be unfair and framing this as an important part 
of the problem—which the Commission does—only distracts from addressing the 
actual problems at hand. When the problem is the constitutional capture in Hungary 
and Poland, how much does one need to read about Ireland and Belgium in order to 
start dealing with the outstanding issues, which the Commission’s Communication 
does not even explicitly name? The failure to outline the core Rule of Law problems 
plaguing the Union undermines the Communication’s vision of the key tools and 
strategies of ‘prevention’, which is not surprising: there can be no ‘prevention’ with-
out clarity as to what you are trying to prevent and the Commission somehow plays 
as if this was not the case.
58 Toggenburg and Grimheden (2016).
59 Kochenov (2008).
60 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No. 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Octo-
ber 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations 
[2014] OJ L317/1.
61 Kelemen (2017).
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1.3  Enforcement
The enforcement aspect of the Rule of Law in the Commission’s Communication 
clearly underlines the role of the Court of Justice, on the one hand, and the money 
that the problematic state receives, on the other. The Commission expresses its com-
mitment to ‘bring to the Court of Justice rule of law problems affecting the appli-
cation of EU law, when these problems could not be solved through the national 
checks and balances’.62 Let us not forget that this is—and has always been—the 
Commission’s duty as the guardian of the Treaties and that its timid fulfilment of 
these duties coupled with the failure to see the full picture—like in the Commission 
v. Hungary cases,63 has unquestionably contributed to the aggravation of the Rule of 
Law crisis in the European constitutional space. It is great that the Court has taken 
the lead and that the Commission acknowledges this and seemingly stands ready to 
start learning from its mistakes.64 The problem, however, is that the Commission 
could be expected to be just as active as the Court from day one when the troubles 
with the constitutional capture started and this has not been the case, lending many 
years of largely untroubled existence to the backsliding governments busy disman-
tling the Rule of Law. The consolidation of their position under the Commission’s 
careless watch is an unquestionable fact: the Commission helped the Orbáns of this 
world to buy time and it was not even expensive. Now that it is probably too late in 
the context of at least two Member States the Commission finally promises the curi-
ous citizens to ‘pursue a strategic approach to infringement proceedings related to 
the rule of law’65 supplemented with requests for expedited proceedings and interim 
measures. It is splendid to hear that the Commission plans to do its job—one would 
normally need no special Communication to be reassured of this, however.
All in all, the triad of enforcement outlined by the Commission essentially 
remains unchanged and includes its Rule of Law Framework; the infringement pro-
ceedings; and Article 7. It is most regrettable that the Commission provides no criti-
cal assessment of the practices of the Rule of Law Framework or Article 7 proce-
dure, both boasting zero results up to now—and for very sound reasons. While the 
Commission awoke to the time-sensitive nature of the infringements of the values,66 
not a single word in the Communication explains why the deeply problematic Rule 
62 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law within the European Union: A Blueprint for 
Action. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, COM(2019) 
343 final, p. 4.
63 Compare Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:687 (compulsory 
retirement of judges) with Case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland Order ex parte of 19 Oct. 2018 
EU:C:2018:852 and Order of 17 Dec. 2018, EU:C:2018:1021.
64 This is what Kim Scheppele, inter alia, has been advocating for years: e.g. Scheppele (2016).
65 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law within the European Union: A Blueprint for 
Action. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’, COM(2019) 
343 final, p. 14.
66 Cf. Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018). Cf. Śledzińska-Simon and Bárd (2019), Gormley (2017).
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of Law Framework, which bought the backsliding governments so much time thanks 
to the Commission’s own initiative, is still part of the tool-box.
The core added value of the ‘enforcement’ part seems to lie in the promise of the 
Commission to start taking its responsibilities rooted in the Treaties seriously and, 
which is also very important, in connecting Rule of Law problems openly to fraud 
and an adverse impact on the EU budget. The Communication contains direct refer-
ences to the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS) and advocates the broader 
involvement of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the context of the fight for the Rule 
of Law. The proposed Regulation on the Protection of EU budget in the case of gen-
eralised Rule of Law deficiencies remains high on the agenda and this can only be 
applauded.
2  The Elephants in the Room
The Commission admitted that part of the challenges that the Rule of Law is now 
facing is an outcome of deliberate policy choices. It does not seem that the Com-
munication has provided any new approach to such ‘hard cases’, however, besides 
promising that the Commission will try to do its job. Most importantly, the literature 
on Rule of Law backsliding—in radical contrast with the Commission’s Communi-
cation—clearly advocates one essential point: it is necessary to be crystal clear on 
the nature of the problem at hand and to act accordingly. Once constitutional capture 
and systemic backsliding in the Member States where opposition to the Rule of Law 
is a systemic political choice has been clearly outlined as the core problem, this is 
bound to alter the remedies required to deal with it. Having piled up a number of rec-
ommendations for itself and others, the Commission absolutely failed to clarify this 
crucially important matter: ‘what is the essence of the EU’s Rule of Law problem?’ 
thus remains a burning question that has not been answered by the Commission in 
its Rule of Law Communication. Indeed, while seemingly armed with what Dixon, 
drawing on Krygier’s work, called an ‘anatomical understanding’, the teleology of 
the Rule of Law has escaped the Commission entirely.67 Failing to answer the ‘what 
is the problem?’ question clearly undermines the clarity of the Commission’s view 
of the remedies proposed. This fundamental mistake could very easily be avoided. 
Inspired by the need for more dialogue with the likes of Hungary and Poland and 
advocating the view that nobody is perfect, the Communication is thus obviously 
not the most effective roadmap—with respect—to deal with constitutional capture, 
which is the only Rule of Law problem hollowing EU’s Article 2 TEU promises and 
worthy of urgent attention. Even the flood of literature on the topic in the context of 
what Ronald Janse called the ongoing ‘renaissance van de Rechtsstaat’ apparently 
had little effect on the Commission.68 In the Rule of Law Communication, however 
67 Dixon (2019).
68 Janse (2018).
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welcome, it is the Rule of Law, precisely, that remained, most regrettably, the ele-
phant in the room.
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